A judgement aggregation rule takes the views of a collection of voters over a set of interconected issues, and yields a logically consistent collective view. The median rule is a judgement aggregation rule that selects the logically consistent view which minimizes the average distance to the views of the voters (where the "distance" between two views is the number of issues on which they disagree). In the special case of preference aggregation, this is called the Kemeny rule. We show that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the median rule is the unique judgement aggregation rule which satisfies three axioms: Ensemble Supermajority Efficiency, Reinforcement, and Continuity. Our analysis covers aggregation problems in which different issues have different weights, and in which the consistency restrictions on input and output judgments may differ.
Introduction
In judgment aggregation, a group is faced with a joint decision; frequently, the members of the group disagree about which decision the group should take and/or the grounds for the decision. Complex decisions can often be described as an interrelated set of judgments on a set of binary issues subject to some admissibility constraint. Admissibility constraints may be logical, normative or physical.
Judgment aggregation theory attempts to determine normative criteria on how to best resolve the disagreement at hand. Such "resolution of disagreement" can be understood in two ways: compromise or consensus. By "consensus", we mean a well-supported inference from the position of a hypothetical impartial observer. By "compromise" we mean the best accommodation of each member's views from their own perspective. In a slogan, the consensus perspective aims to maximize plausibility, while the compromise perspective aims to maximize concordance.
Judgment aggregation pertains both to groups that act as sovereigns ("electorates"), as in democratic elections and referenda, and to groups that act as delegate bodies ("committees"), such as multi-member courts, corporate boards, central banks. A key rationale of the existence of many committees is the production of decisions that are sound from an independent third-party perspective; in those cases, the judgment aggregation framework seems especially apt, arguably often more so than the more common and established preference aggregation framework.
Given a profile of views by the group members (henceforth: "voters"), which view should the group adopt? Which view enjoys the highest "support" ("plausibility" or "concordance")? In recent work (Nehring et al., , 2016 Pivato, 2014, 2018) , we have explored a "majoritarian" approach to this question. Its hallmark is to evaluate support issue by issue in terms of the sign and size of issue-wise majorities. In simple cases in which the issue-wise majorities happen to produce a jointly feasible view, on the majoritarian approach, this view enjoys the highest support, and should thus be adopted by the group. But issue-wise majorities may well not yield a consistent view. In the context of preference aggregation, this is the well-known Condorcet paradox. Analoguous inconsistencies are very common in judgment aggregation (Guilbaud, 1952; Kornhauser and Sager, 1986; List and Pettit, 2002) , and have stimulated an intensive investigation in economic theory, philosophy, and computer science; see e.g. List and Puppe (2009) and Mongin (2012) for recent surveys.
A satisfactory normative account thus needs to be able to deal with the Condorcetinconsistent cases. In contrast to the focus on impossibility results in much of the literature just referenced, in this paper we make a case for a particular normative decision criterion: the median rule. The median rule maximizes the total numerical support (number of votes) for a view, summed over all issues. (Generically, this maximizer is unique.) Equivalently, the median rule minimizes the average distance to the views of the voters (where the "distance" between two views is measured by the number of issues on which they differ).
Our characterization of the median rule is based on three normative axioms. First, majoritarianism over multiple issues is encoded in an axiom called "Ensemble Supermajority Efficiency" (ESME), which itself is an extension of the normatively more basic principle of "Supermajority Efficiency" (SME). The SME principle says that if, in the comparison of two admissible views x and y, x agrees with the majority on more issues than y, then y is inferior as a group view, and thus should not be adopted by the group. Furthermore, and more demandingly, for any fixed 'quorum' q, we count how many supermajorities of size at least q agree with x or with y. If x agrees with at least as many size-q supermajorities as y for all values of q, and x agrees with at more size-q supermajorities as y for some value of q, then again y is inferior as a group view, and should not be adopted by the group. Thus, SME takes into account the size of the supporting supermajorities in a manner analogous to first-order stochastic dominance in decision theory. The ESME axiom extends SME to "ensembles" of judgment aggregation problems consisting of multiple instances of same type of judgment aggregation problem but with different profiles.
Second, the axiom of Reinforcement says that if two subpopulations independently choose the same view under the rule, then the combined population should also choose this view under the rule. It is a standard, highly versatile axiom originally due to Smith (1973) and Young (1974) . Finally, Continuity asserts that the group judgment is robust under small perturbations of the distribution of input judgments. Our first main result, Theorem 1, characterizes the median rule as the unique judgment aggregation rule satisfying ESME, Reinforcement and Continuity. Theorem 1 is based on a weak minimal richness on the input space called "thickness".
Theorem 1 treats all issues symmetrically. This is warranted in many standard applications whose structure is sufficiently symmetric such as the aggregation of rankings (linear or weak orderings), of classifiers (equivalence relations) or in multi-winner choice problems. But other applications lack these symmetries; furthermore, different issues, whether or not formally symmetric, may be given different " importance". For example, consider truth-functional aggregation, which was the focus of much of the early literature in judgment aggregation inspired by Kornhauser and Sager's (1986) "doctrinal paradox". In truth-functional aggregation, one or more "conclusion judgments" are logically ("truthfunctionally") determined by a number of "premise judgments". Condorcet inconsistency takes the form of the "discursive dilemma": issuewise aggregation of majorities on the premises may well determine (by truth-functional implication) judgments on the conclusions that differ from the majority judgment on these conclusions. The discursive dilemma can be resolved via the median rule by trading off majority overrides on the premises against majority overrides on the conclusions. However, in view the structural and conceptual asymmetry between premises and conclusions, they have different standing, and it would appear quite arbitrary to give them equal weight.
In section 5, we thus generalize the analysis to weighted judgment contexts in which different issues have different weights. The definitions of SME, ESME and the median rule generalize naturally. However, as shown by counterexample, Theorem 1 does not carry over in full generality. The characterization for weighted judgement contexts in Theorem 2 must invoke not just richness conditions on the space of admissible input judgments, but also restrictions on the "combinatorial geomety" of the space of admissible output judgments. We note that, while previous work on judgment aggregation assumed the input and output spaces to be the same, we allow them to differ. This adds useful additional generality at very modest cost in execution.
Due to the abstraction and generality of our judgment aggregation framework, it has a broad and diverse range of applications. We thus illustrate our concepts and results in a number of examples, including applications to approval voting on committees with composition constraints, assignment problems, uniform treatment of heterogeneous cases, missing information, and multiple criteria. See Nehring and Puppe (2007) , Nehring and Pivato (2011) or for many more examples.
The main comparison result in the literature is the remarkable characterization of the median rule in the aggregation of linear orderings ("rankings") by Young and Levenglick (1978) . In this setting (mathematically equivalent to the setting of Arrovian preference aggregation), the median rule is also known as the Kemeny (1959) rule.
For the problem of aggregating ordinal rankings, our assumptions are broadly similar philosophically to those of Young and Levenglick (1978) , but differ in the specifics, our assumptions being on the whole 'stronger'. We thus do not claim that when applied to the aggregation of rankings, our Theorem 1 improves on Young and Levenglick's result. Our aims are simply different. While their result relies heavily on particular features of the combinatorial geometry of the space of ordinal rankings, Theorem 1 is a "one-size-fits-all" result that covers a wide range of judgment aggregation problems. (See the end of section 4 for a more detailed comparison)
This paper belongs to a larger project exploring multi-issue majoritarianism in judgment aggregation. In particular, the main results in the present paper rely on results in a companion paper (Nehring and Pivato, 2018) , which show that judgment aggregation rules that satisfy ESME and Continuity are representable as "additive majority rules". Additive majority rules can be viewed as non-linear generalizations of the median rule; they evaluate views not simply in terms of the (weighted) sum of numeric issue-wise majorities, but in terms of the (weighted) sum of issue-wise majority gains, which are possibly non-linear transformations of these numeric issue-wise majorities. Theorems 1 and 2 can be read as showing that Reinforcement implies the existence of a representation as an additive majority rule with a linear gain function. While plausible, the asserted connection between Reinforcement and linearity is less straightforward than it may look, and the proof encounters a number of non-trivial obstacles, among them the need for substantive structural assumptions on the judgment space, which play no role in obtaining an additive majority representation in the first place.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the formal framework. Section 3 introduces the axioms of ESME and Continuity, and explains that additive majority rules are the only rules satisfying these axioms. Section 4 states our axiomatic characterization of the median rule for unweighted judgement aggregation contexts. Section 5 introduces weighted judgement contexts, and Section 6 extends our axiomatic characterization to such contexts. All proofs are in the Appendices.
Judgement aggregation
Let K be a finite set of logical propositions or issues, each of which can be either affirmed or denied. A view is an assignment of an assertoric (Yes-No) value to each issue, represented by an element of {±1} K . A judgement space is a collection of views -that is, a subset of {±1} K -determined by certain constraints. These constraints can arise in several ways: as a matter of logical consistency (as in truth-functional aggregation problems), as a matter of "rational coherence" (as in transitivity conditions on orderings) or as mere "feasibility" (as in multi-winner choice problems).
Example 1. (Aggregation of rankings) Let A be a finite set of alternatives. We can represent the set of all strict ordinal rankings of A as a judgement space X rk A ⊂ {±1} K , where the elements of K represent assertions of the form "a b" for each pair a, b ∈ A, and admissibility is given by transitivity.
To be technically specific, let K ⊂ A × A be a subset such that (a, a) ∈ K for any a ∈ A, and for each distinct a, b ∈ A, exactly one of the pairs (a, b) or (b, a) is in K. Any complete, antisymmetric binary relation on A can be represented by a unique element x of {±1} K by setting x ab = 1 if a b, whereas x ab = −1 if and only if a ≺ b. A ⊂ {±1} J , where the elements of J represent assertions of the form "a ≈ b", for each pair a, b ∈ A. Again, to be formally specific, let K be the set of all two-element subsets of A. Any symmetric, reflexive binary relation ∼ on A can be represented by a unique element x of {±1} K by setting x ab = 1 if and only if a ∼ b. Let X eq A be the set of all elements of {±1} K corresponding to equivalence relations on A.
2 Judgement aggregation on X eq A arises when each voter has her own way of classifying the elements of A into equivalence classes, and the group must agree on some common classification system. ♦ Other judgement spaces represent common collective decision problems such as resource allocation, committee selection, or taxonomic classification. One particularly well-known class of examples are the so-called truth-functional aggregation problems. In this case, the issues in K are divided into two classes: "premises" and "conclusions", and the truth-values of the conclusions are logically entailed by the truth-values of the premises. The space X is then the set of all logically consistent assignments of truth values to the premises and conclusions. See Nehring and Puppe (2007) , Pivato (2011) or Nehring et al. (2014) for many more examples.
Judgment aggregation rules map profiles of views to a group view or set of views. Typically, both outputs and inputs are subject to feasibility or logical consistency constraints, which are encoded by two judgement spaces X and Y, respectively. In many cases, the restrictions on inputs and outputs are the same (so that X = Y), but they need not be. For example, one might require output views to be fully rationally coherent (e.g. transitive), but allow input views that are not, for example to accommodate bounded rationality in voters. Or output views may take into account feasibility consideration, while input views
A is the set of all x ∈ {±1} K satisfying the following transitivity constraint, for all distinct a, b, c ∈ A: if (x ab = 1 or x ba = −1), and (x bc = 1 or x cb = −1), then (x ac = 1 or x ca = −1).
2 Formally: X eq A is the set of all x ∈ {±1} K satisfying the transitivity constraint (x ab = x bc = 1) =⇒ (x ac = 1), for all distinct a, b, c ∈ A.
do not. (As in single-or multi-winner Approval voting). We thus define an (unweighted) judgement context to be a triple C := (K, X , Y), where K is a (finite) set of issues and X ⊆ Y ⊆ {±1} K , with X being the "input space", and Y being the "output space". We assume that X ⊆ Y; i.e. output views must satisfy all admissibility restrictions that input views do, and maybe more. A profile is a function µ : Y−→[0, 1] such that y∈Y µ(y) = 1. This represents a population of weighted voters; for each y ∈ Y, µ(y) is the total weight of the voters who hold the view y. If all voters have the same weight, then µ(y) is simply the proportion of the electorate which holds the view y. But we allow the possibility that different voters have different weights, e.g. because of different levels of expertise or different stakes in the outcome. By summarizing the voters' views with a function µ : Y−→[0, 1], we abstract from the exact number of voters, and we render them anonymous, except for their weights: voters with the same weight are indistinguishible in our model.
If Y is a judgement space, then we define ∆(Y) to be the set of all profiles on Y. If C = (K, X , Y) is a judgement context, then we define ∆(C) := ∆(Y). A judgement problem is an ordered pair (C, µ), where C is a judgement context, and µ ∈ ∆(C). Judgement aggregation is the process of converting such a judgement problem into a view (or set of views) in X . A judgement aggregation rule on C is a correspondence F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X , which produces a nonempty (usually singleton) subset F (µ) ⊆ X for any profile µ ∈ ∆(Y). (Sometimes, we will write "F (X , µ)" instead of "F (µ)").
The median rule is a particularly attractive judgement aggregation rule. To define it, we need some notation. Recall that X ⊆ Y ⊆ {±1} K ⊂ R K . Thus, each view y ∈ Y can be regarded as a vector in R K . For any profile µ ∈ ∆(Y), we define its majority vector
For all k ∈ K, we have µ k > 0 if a (weighted) majority of voters affirm or support the issue k, whereas µ k < 0 if a majority deny or oppose k. The majority ideal is the element
3 However, for many profiles µ ∈ ∆(Y), it turns out that x µ ∈ X . (This can happen even when Y = X .) In other words, it is frequently impossible to agree with the µ-majority in every issue in K, while respecting the underlying logical constraints which define the judgement space X .
Informally, the median rule maximizes the average agreement with µ-majorities across all the issues in K. Formally, for all µ ∈ ∆(Y), we define
For any x ∈ X , let x • µ := k∈K x k µ k . Then we can rewrite (2) in a simpler form:
As we noted in the introduction, in the special case of the aggregation of rankings (i.e. when X = Y = X rk A ), the median rule is equivalent to the Kemeny rule.
3 For simplicity, we assume in this paragraph that µ k = 0 for all k ∈ K; this is not essential.
There is another way to define and motivate the median rule via a natural notion of distance due to Kemeny (1959) ; see Monjardet (2008) for a broad survey. For any x, y ∈ {±1} K , we define their Hamming distance by d(x, y) := #{k ∈ K; x k = y k }. It is easy to see that the median rule selects the view(s) in X that minimize the average Hamming distance to the views of the voters; in the terminology of Miller and Osherson (2009) and Lang et al. (2011) , it is a distance-minimizing rule.
4 Distance-minimizing rules are themselves a subclass of scoring rules, which have been studied by Dietrich (2014) .
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This metric interpretation is particularly appealing when the task of judgment aggregation is to find an optimal compromise. From this perspective, the Hamming distance of the collective view from the view of any voter is a natural measure of the "burden of compromise" imposed on that voter, and the median view(s) are those that minimize the aggregate burden of compromise.
Additive majority rules
Median rules are a special case of "additive majority rules" (AMRs), and the proofs of our main results in Sections 4 and 5 rely on broader results for AMRs obtained in the companion paper (Nehring and Pivato, 2018) . Like the median rule, additive majority rules try to maximize the "total agreement with majorities", where the "total" is taken by summing over all issues in K, and where the "agreement with majorities" is measured by applying an increasing function (called the gain function) to the coordinates of the majority vector µ. This allows, in particular, larger majorities (especially unanimous or almost unanimous majorites) to carry a disproportionately greater weight than smaller majorities. The added generality appears potentially useful especially from a consensus perspective, from which non-linearities in the gain function can naturally be interpreted as reflecting non-linearities in the plausibility of (evidential support for) judgments as a function of the balance of majorities supporting them.
In some cases, one might even want larger majorities to lexicographically dominate smaller majorities. To allow for such possibilities, we must allow the gain function to take infinite and/or infinitesimal values. Formally, this can be done letting the gain function take values in some linearly ordered field containing, and possibly strictly including the reals. By the results of Nehring and Pivato (2018) , the hyperreal numbers are sufficiently general; thus, we define the codomain of the gain function as the linearly ordered field of hyperreal numbers *
R,
6 and let φ : [−1, 1]−→ * R be an increasing function (the gain function). The additive majority rule F φ : ∆(Y) ⇒ X is defined:
In particular, the median rule is an additive majority rule. To see this, let φ(x) := x for all x ∈ [−1, 1]; then formula (4) reduces to the formula (2). The main result of this section stated below is adapted from Nehring and Pivato (2018) , and is a key step in our axiomatic characterization of the median rule. It states that additive majority rules are the only judgement aggregation rules that can simultaneously satisfy two axioms: Ensemble Supermajority Efficiency and Continuity.
Supermajority efficiency. For any x ∈ X and q ∈ [0, 1], we define γ µ x (q) := #{k ∈ K; x k µ k ≥ q}; this yields a non-increasing function γ µ x : [0, 1]−→R. We say x ∈ X is supermajority efficient (SME) for the judgement problem (X , µ) if there does not exist any z ∈ X such that γ µ z (q) ≥ γ µ x (q) for all q ∈ [0, 1], with strict inequality for some q. Let SME (X , µ) be the set of such views. If x ∈ SME (X , µ), then it is impossible to change a coordinate of x to capture one more µ-supermajority of size q, without either losing at least one µ-supermajority of size q ≥ q, or losing at least two µ-supermajorities of size q ≤ q. In the Condorcet consistent case, i.e. if the majority ideal x µ is in X , then SME (X , µ) = {x µ }. We will say that a judgement aggregation rule F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X is supermajority efficient (SME) if F (µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ) for any choice of µ ∈ ∆(Y). It is easily verified that any additive majority rule is SME (Nehring and Pivato, 2018) . The next example illustrates the significance of supermajority efficiency. K , let #x := #{k ∈ K; x k = 1}. With K denoting the set of candidates, the set of feasible committees can be written as the set X K L = {x ∈ {±1} K : #x = L}. This encoding breaks down the selection of a committee into |K| binary issues, each of the form "should candidate k be a member of the committee?" There are two natural input spaces. On the one hand, with Y = X , each voter's input consists of a feasible committee, naturally interpreted as her own view of the best committee. On the other hand, with Y = {±1} K , a voter's input consists of an independent judgment on each candidate; this could be interpreted as a judgment of "competency" or "merit" of the candidate. In line with the literature, we will refer to such judgments as judgments of "approval", and the domain {±1} K as the approval domain on K.
Consider any profile µ ∈ ∆ (Y) ; to sidestep ties, assume for simplicity that all majority margins µ k are different. In such cases, the SME criterion singles out a unique committee as optimal, namely the committee composed of the L candidates with the highest majority margins µ k (regardless of whether or not these are positive). Since AMRs are supermajority efficient , this agrees with the output of any AMR, including the median rule. With the approval domain and L = 1, SME thus selects the candidate k with the highest µ k ; this is just the approval voting rule of Brams and Fishburn (1983) . With L > 1, SME yields "multi-winner approval voting". Multi-winner approval voting is rationalized here via SME which evaluates views (i.e. committees) issue by issue (i.e. candidate by candidate).
Multi-winner approval voting evaluates committees exclusively based on the "standalone" evaluation of by their judged merit. In many situations, there is also a shared interest in the composition of the committee, for example to ensure broad expertise or broad representation of perspectives or stake-holders. A simple way to incorporate such considerations is by way of exogenous composition constraints which restrict the set of admissible committees X to a strict subset of X K L . For example, in the selection of a university-wide committee, one may want to ensure an adequate representation of types of disciplines j ∈ J (such as humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, engineering) by imposing a minimum size of the membership of each group L j . With {K j } j∈J describing the partition of candidates according to their disciplinary type, this composition constraint yields an output space X = {x ∈ X K L : #{k ∈ K j : x k = 1} ≥ L j for all j ∈ J }. Again, except for possible ties, the SME criterion yields unique optimal committees: first, for each group j ∈ J , select the L j candidates with the highest majority support in that group; second, fill the remaining L − j∈J L j candidates with those among the not-yet selected candidates with the highest majority support across all disciplines.
In more complex situations, more than one type of classification may be considered relevant such as academic rank, gender, or ethnicity, leading to additional, overlapping composition requirements. In those cases, SME might no longer select a uniquely optimal committee; that selection might now depend on the particular AMR used. The median rule in particular selects those comittees x with the highest overall approval k:x k =1 µ k ; it thus yields a natural formulation of multi-winner approval voting under composition constraints. ♦ Ensemble supermajority efficiency. In applying the SME criterion to judgment aggregation rules, not just single profiles, one can get additional leverage by considering ensembles of judgment problems. Such ensembles consist of N instances of the same judgment context with potentially different profiles µ 1 , . . . , µ N . To picture such ensembles concretely, an academic electorate may need to simultaneously appoint committees with different tasks but the same structure (composition constraint). Or, in a sequential version of the same idea, it may need to annually elect a committe for a given task and structure, but potentially different candidates. From a normative standpoint, it suffices to assume that these ensembles are meaningful as hypotheticals; they do not need to be actual features of the judgment problem at hand.
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To apply SME formally to ensembles, one needs to represent ensembles of judgment contexts as judgment contexts on their own. To do so, simply enhance the issue space to the N −fold disjoint union of (copies of) K written as N · K, and let the output and input spaces be N -fold Cartesian powers X N := X × · · · × X and
, we define its nth marginal µ n ∈ ∆(Y) to be the profile such that, for any x ∈ Y,
7 Their role is thus quite similar to the role of counterfactual profiles in multi-profile restrictions.
An N -tuple of profiles {µ 1 , . . . , µ N } can be represented by any profile µ ∈ ∆ Y N such that, for each n ∈ [1 . . . N ], µ n = µ n . Consider thus an "ensemble problem" (C N , µ). Denote the normative output for this problem by F N (µ). It seems plausible that this normative output should be obtained by applying the rule F factor by factor. In other words,
is itself a well-defined judgment aggregation problem, SME applies to it, just as it does to 'ordinary' judgment aggregation problems. We are thus lead to the axiom of Ensemble Supermajority Efficiency. ESME. For any number of instances N ∈ N and profile µ ∈ ∆ Y N , any element of
This axiom requires F to be supermajority efficient. But it requires more, because an ensemble view x ∈ X N that is SME instance-by-instance need not be SME overall. Indeed, we shall soon see that any aggregation rule that satisfies ESME must be an additive majority rule, as soon as it is continuous in the following sense .
Continuity. For every profile µ ∈ ∆(Y), and every sequence {µ
This axiom says that the correspondence F is upper hemicontinuous with respect to the usual, Euclidean topology on ∆(Y). This means that F is robust against small perturbations or errors in the specification of µ. It also means that, if a very large population of voters is mixed with a much smaller population, then the views of the large population essentially determine the outcome of the rule. The following result is an adaptation of a main result in the companion paper Nehring and Pivato (2018) .
Proposition 1 Let F be a judgement aggregation rule on a judgement context C. If F satisfies ESME and Continuity on ∆(C), then F is an additive majority rule.
Axiomatic characterization of the median rule
To characterize the median rule, we will need one more axiom in addition to the two which appeared in Proposition 1: Reinforcement.
Reinforcement. Let µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ ∆(Y) be two profiles, describing two subpopulations of size S 1 and S 2 . Let c 1 = S 1 /(S 1 + S 2 ) and c 2 = S 2 /(S 1 + S 2 ). Then µ = c 1 µ 1 + c 2 µ 2 is the profile of the combined population. If each subpopulation separately endorses some view x ∈ X , then the combined population presumably should also endorse this view. The next axiom formalizes this desideratum.
8 The profile µ also contains information about the joint distribution of views over the different instances of Y. But this extra information is immaterial to ESME, since it is used in neither
Reinforcement. For any profiles µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ ∆(Y) with F (µ 1 ) ∩ F (µ 2 ) = ∅, and any c 1 , c 2 ∈ (0, 1) with
. In other words, for any view x ∈ X , we have x ∈ F (µ 1 ) ∩ F (µ 2 ) if and only if x ∈ F (µ).
In the present setting, Reinforcement is appealing especially from a compromise perspective. If a particular view x minimize the aggregate "burden of compromise" within some subpopulation µ 1 and the same view x happens to minimize the aggregate "burden of compromise" within a disjoint subpopulation µ 2 , it stands to reason that x ipso facto minimizes the aggregate "burden of compromise" within the combined population µ. This argument for Reinforcement parallels a standard argument for Reinforcement as an Extended Pareto condition in preference aggregation (Dhillon and Mertens, 1999) . Reinforcement seems less compelling prima facie from the consensus perspective which treats the input judgments as the 'evidential basis' for an outside observer; in particular, the consensus perspective bars an 'extended Pareto' argument for Reinforcement. For example, consider a situation in which there is unanimous agreement on some issue k in one subpopulation with profile µ while there is a near tie in the other subpopulation µ . At both profiles, the same view x happens to be selected as 'most plausible' according to F . In the combined population, say µ =
µ , there is a clear majority on k, but it is far from unanimity. So the profile µ is materially distinct as evidence from either µ or µ , and it may very well be sensible to select a view y different from x as 'most plausible' given the evidence µ . This may well happen, for example, at some profiles under an additive majority rule with a non-linear gain function φ.
While the case for a linear gain function may not be as compelling from a consensus perspective as it is from a compromise perspective (via Reinforcement), there is still a good case to be made on the basis of a "default principle" of sorts. The next axiom serves as an axiomatic expression of such a default principle. In contrast to Reinforcement, which is a variable-population axiom, the next axiom compares profiles within a fixed population of voters. In a nutshell, it considers how the rule F should respond to a change of opinion in one sub-population while the opinion of the complementary sub-population remains fixed. It says that F should always respond to a given opinion change in the same way, independent of the opinion of the complementary sub-population; it is conceptually analogous to the axiom of Tradeoff Consistency in decision theory.
Judgement Consistency. For any c 1 , c 2 ∈ (0, 1) with c 1 +c 2 = 1, and any profiles µ, µ , ν, ν ∈ ∆(Y), and any views x, y ∈ X , if (a) y ∈ F (c 1 µ + c 2 ν), and (b) x ∈ F (c 1 µ + c 2 ν), and (c) y ∈ F (c 1 µ + c 2 ν), and
The idea here is that F should only select the views in X which have the greatest 'plausibility' in light of the input judgments. In the above axiom, µ, µ are profiles describing two possible distributions opinions for a subpopulation S 1 making up a proportion c 1 of the total population, while ν, ν are profiles describing two possible distributions of opinions for the complementary subpopulation S 2 (making up the proportion c 2 = 1−c 1 of the total population). Hypotheses (a), (b), and (c) say that the shift in the distribution of opinions from µ to µ shifts the balance of plausbility from y to x, when the S 2 subpopulation has profile ν. Thus, if we start with another profile (c 1 µ + c 2 ν ) where x is already weakly more plausible than y (hypothesis (d)), then the same shift of opinion from µ to µ among subpopulation S 1 should again make the x strictly more plausible than y (conclusion (e)).
It is easy to verify that the median rule satisfies Judgement Consistency. The next result describes the logical relationship between the last three axioms.
Proposition 2 If an aggregation rule satisfies Continuity and Judgement Consistency, then it satisfies Reinforcement.
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To obtain the desired axiomatization of the median rule, we will need a weak structural condition on
We will say that Y is thick if conv(Y) has dimension |K|. To motivate this assumption, note that conv(Y) is the set of majority vectors associated with admissible profiles µ; that is, conv(Y) = { µ : µ ∈ ∆ (Y)}. Thus, thickness just says that the domain of profiles is sufficiently "rich".
Most interesting judgment aggregation spaces are thick. For examples, spaces of rankings (Example 1) are thick, as are spaces of classifiers (Example 2). Evidently, the "approval spaces" {±1} K involved in the Committee Voting examples are thick. See Nehring and Pivato (2011) for many other examples. Here is our first main result.
X be a judgement aggregation rule. Then F satisfies ESME, Continuity, and Reinforcement if and only if F is the median rule.
Note that thickness restriction applies only to the input space Y, while the output space X is left entirely unrestricted. For example the committee spaces X K L from Example 3 is not thick; since it is defined by an affine feasibility restriction, it has dimension |K| − 1, not |K|. Nevertheless, Theorem 1 still applies to Multi-Winner Approval Voting under Constraints, because the input space is Y = {±1} K . In the traditional setting in which X = Y, the thickness assumption obviously applies to the output space as well. In this case, Theorem 1 simplifies as follows.
Corollary 1 Let X be a thick judgement space. An aggregation rule F : ∆(X ) ⇒ X satisfies ESME, Continuity, and Reinforcement if and only if F is the median rule.
By Proposition 2, the statements of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 remain true if Reinforcement is replaced by Judgement Consistency. All three axioms are necessary for the characterization. For example:
• If φ : [−1, 1]−→R is increasing and continuous, then the additive majority rule F φ satisfies ESME and Continuity. But F φ does not satisfy Reinforcement unless it is the median rule.
• All scoring rules satisfy Reinforcement and Continuity (Myerson, 1995) , but typically violate ESME.
• Let > be an arbitrary strict order on X . One can construct a single-valued refinement of the median rule which satisfies ESME and Reinforcement and breaks any tie by choosing the >-maximal element. But this rule does not satisfy Continuity.
In the special case in which X = Y is the space of linear orderings, Theorem 1 yields a counterpart to the seminal contribution by Young and Levenglick (1978) . As we already mentioned in the introduction Young and Levenglick characterize the median rule for such spaces by three assumptions: Condorcet Consistency, Neutrality and Reinforcement. While their Reinforcement axiom is exactly the same as ours, the other axioms are not quite comparable. Condorcet Consistency is somewhat weaker than SME (hence a fortiori weaker than ESME) but not entirely, since it also deals with majority ties. 10 Neutrality is the standard axiom of a symmetry in alternatives. Since any additive majority rule is neutral, in view of Proposition 1, Neutrality is implied here by ESME plus Continuity. It is not quite implied by ESME alone, since non-neutral selections from AMRs would satisfy ESME as well. Conceptually, a lot of Neutrality is built into ESME via its symmetric treatment of issues.
The three axioms in the Young-Levenglick theorem are meaningful for general judgment aggregation contexts, with Neutrality understood as invariance to any symmetries of the context (input and output spaces) under permutations of issues. However, only rarely will they suffice to uniquely characterize the median rule, simply because in most contexts, there will be few if any symmetries to exploit.
Mathematically, the two results and their proofs are very different. Young and Levenglick's proof is a tour de force that strongly exploits the special combinatorial features of the permutation polytope conv(X rk A ). By contrast, our proof of Theorem 1 needs to effectively sidestep the combinatorial structure of the context. Even equipped with Proposition 1, this requires significant work because the intended generality precludes the use of arguments that exploit special properties of the combinatorial structure of a particular context. A proof sketch of Theorem 1 will be provided at the end of section 5.
There is considerable discussion on various versions of the median rule in the more mathematically oriented literature; see, for example, Chapter 5 of the monograph of Day and McMorris (2003) , and also Monjardet (2008) . Axiomatizations appear largely confined to median spaces defined in Nehring and Puppe (2007) as an adaption of "median graphs" to judgment aggregation spaces. In particular, McMorris et al. (2000) provide a characterization of the median rule in median graphs/spaces based on a local Condorcet condition and Reinforcement. 10 Say that a view x is Condorcet dominant if, for all k ∈ K, µ k · x k ≥ 0. A rule F is Condorcet consistent if F is equal to the set of all Condorcet dominant views whenever that set is non-empty.
11 However, in median spaces, the median rule is characterized by Condorcet consistency alone. Indeed, as shown in Nehring and Puppe (2007) , the median spaces are exactly the spaces in which this is the case.
Extension to weighted judgement contexts
The formulation of judgement aggregation in Section 2 implicitly gave the same weight to the voters' opinions on all issues. But sometimes such "equal weighting" is not appropriate. For example, in a truth-functional aggregation problem, we may wish to give a higher weight to the voters' opinions about the premises than their opinions about the conclusions. The most extreme form of this is the "premise-based" aggregation rule, which aggregates the voters' views on each premise by majority vote, but completely ignores their opinions about the conclusions; instead, the collective opinion about each conclusion is logically derived from the majoritarian opinons on the premises. At the opposite extreme is the "conclusion-based" aggregation rule, which aggregates the voters' opinions on each conclusion by majority vote, and mostly ignores their opinions about the premises, except when these opinions can be aggregated in a manner which is logically consistent with the majority opinions about the conclusions. Between these extremes, there are rules which give greater or lesser weight to the voters' views on different premises and conclusions.
There are other judgement aggregation problems where one might want to assign different weight to the voters' opinions on different issues. Indeed, only if a problem had a high amount of "symmetry" (e.g. aggregation of rankings) would there be a strong a priori reason to assign the same weight to all issues. For this reason, we now introduce a weight vector λ = (λ k ) k∈K , where λ k > 0 is the "weight" which we assign to the voters' opinions on issue k. Roughly speaking, λ k would be large if we were very unwilling to overrule the majority opinion in issue k. Conversely, λ k would be small if we were quite ready to overrule this opinion, if this was necessary to achieve a coherent collective view. A weighted judgement context is a quadruple C := (K, λ, X , Y), where K is a (finite) set of issues, λ ∈ R K + is a weight vector, and X ⊆ Y ⊆ {±1} K , with X being the set of "admissible collective views", and Y being the set of "admissible individual views". (In particular, an unweighted judgement context of the kind considered in Sections 2 to 4 can be represented by setting λ = (1, 1, . . . , 1).) A judgement problem is an ordered pair (C, µ), where C is a (weighted) judgement context, and µ ∈ ∆(Y) is a profile. For any x ∈ X and q ∈ [0, 1], we now define γ
This yields a non-increasing function γ λ µ,x : [0, 1]−→R. If C is an unweighted judgement context (i.e. λ = (1, . . . , 1)), then formula (6) reduces to the definition of γ µ x from Section 3. We say x ∈ X is supermajority efficient (SME) for the judgement problem (C, µ) if there does not exist any z ∈ X such that γ λ µ,z (q) ≥ γ λ µ,x (q) for all q ∈ [0, 1], with strict inequality for some q. A judgement aggregation rule F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X is supermajority efficient on C if, for any µ ∈ ∆(Y), every element of F (µ) is supermajority efficient for (C, µ).
R is a gain function, then the additive majority rule on C is the correspondence F φ : ∆(Y) ⇒ X defined as follows:
In particular, the median rule on C is defined by
where
If C is an unweighted judgement context (i.e. λ = (1, . . . , 1)), then this reduces to the "unweighted" median rule defined by formula (2). For any x, y ∈ {±1} K , we define their λ-weighted distance by d λ (x, y) := {λ k ; k ∈ K and x k = y k }. The median rule (8) can be equivalently defined as selecting the view(s) in X minimizing the average λ-weighted distance to the views of the voters. In Section 6, we will provide an axiomatic characterization of the weighted median rule (8), similar to Theorem 1. First, we will motivate the theory of weighted judgement contexts in general -and the weighted median rule in particular -with two interesting applications: assignment problems and uniform decisions. But an impatient reader can skip directly to Section 6 without loss of logical continuity.
Assignment problems
Consider a group of voters who need to assign different candidates to different of positions such as the positions in a cabinet. There is a set A := {1, . . . , A} of "candidates" and a set B := {1, . . . , B} of "positions", with A ≥ B.
12 (As in the matching literature, there are many different possible interpretation; for example, "positions" could be unique resources such as organ transplants, and "candidates" could be possible recipients. Judgment aggregation might be required when different group members entertain different standards of fair allocation).
Assignments can be described in terms of an issue space K = A × B, with the issue (a, b) addressing the question: "should candidate a hold position b"? Feasibility requires that any position be filled by exactly one candidate, and that any candidate can fill at most one position. Feasible assignments can thus be described as B−tuples ((a 1 , . . . , a B )) saying that candidate a b is assigned to position b. More explicitly in issue space, the tuple ((a 1 , . . . , a B )) refers to the view x ∈ {±1} A×B such that x ab = 1 iff a = a b , and x ab = −1 iff a = a b . The feasible output space is the set of all such judgments X asgn A×B . By contrast, we will allow input judgments to be unrestricted approval judgments for each position; thus Y = {±1} A×B . Generally, different positions will differ in their "importance", so it will be natural to assign weights λ a,b of the form λ a,b = λ b , where λ b reflects the importance of position b.
This defines a judgement context
A×B . In such a context, the median rule selects the assignment x = ((a 1 , . . . , a B )) that maximizes the weighted sum
To illustrate the role of the weights, consider, as a simple example, a profile of input views µ all of which assess candidate quality as independent of position, i.e. µ a,b = µ a,b for all a ∈ A, and b, b ∈ B. In such profiles, supermajority efficient rules such as the weighted median rule (8) will assign the better candidates to the more important positions. Likewise, in arbitrary profiles, if the weight for some position b * is much larger than that for any other position, the median rule fills that position by the candidate a with the highest majority support µ (a,b * ) (up to, possibly, near ties).
Uniform Decisions
The following "uniform decision" model is in fact a scheme of examples generating more complex judgment aggregation contexts from simpler ones. We first present the formal scheme, and then illustrate three types of applications referred to as Heterogeneous Cases, Missing Information, and Multiple Criteria.
Let C = (K, λ, X , Y) be a "base" judgement context. Let S be an abstract set of "instances"; in the three applications, the elements of S will be interpreted as "cases", "states" or "criteria". Let λ := (λ s ) s∈S be a vector assigning a "weight" to each instance; in the three applications, these weights will be interpreted as the frequencies of the cases, the probabilities of the states, or the relative importance of the criteria. (We will provide more detail below.) While input judgments are made instance-wise, these form the basis for a single output judgment that governs all instances uniformly. This situation can be described formally by a "uniform" judgement context C = ( K, λ, X , Y) defined as follows.
(iv) For all k ∈ K and s ∈ S, λ k,s := λ s λ k .
Part (iii) allows input judgments to vary independently across instances, while (ii) says that output judgments must be constant across instances. Part (iv) says that the weight of a composite issue (k, s) rescales the base weight λ k by the instance weight λ s .
Heterogeneous Cases
To flesh out the first interpretation in terms of heterogeneous instances, consider the very simplest judgment aggregation problem given by a single yes-no issue, i.e. |K| = 1.
For example, a group needs to decide on whether to establish a rule which permits or forbids some types of action or behaviour. Concrete examples include traffic laws, workplace codes of conduct, or safety regulations at a public swimming pool. More contentious examples include restrictions on libel, hate speech, obscenity, or incitement.
13 For this rule 13 See Miller (2013) for a recent contribution to this theme in the judgment aggregation literature.
to be simple, unambiguous, and enforceable in a non-arbitrary and independently verifiable way, it must be based on a relatively coarse description of the action. Of course, in each particular case, the "correct" or "just" decision may depend on some finer details of the action (and surrounding context). But even if these details are observable in principle, it is not feasible to explicitly condition the actual decision on them, e.g. for reasons of complexity or non-verifiability. So the best the group can do is to get it right "on balance" across comparable cases s ∈ S. Voters give their judgments about the right decision in each case. The uniform group decision is then to be taken on the basis of the entire vector of majorities ( µ s ) s∈S . The cases could be actual or hypothetical. For actual cases, the weights λ s would naturally reflect their frequency of occurence. For hypothetical cases, the weights λ s would naturally reflect their 'relevance' or 'representativeness'. Additive majority rules yields a positive uniform decision just in case
Hence, the median rule in particular yields a positive uniform decision iff s∈S λ s µ s ≥ 0, i.e. just in case the weighted average of majorities across comparable cases is non-negative.
Missing Information
The uniform decision model can also be applied to situations in which the group is missing information relevant to the judgment task. For example, in foreign policy, macroeconomic management, and environmental regulation, the right course of action may depend on information which is unavailable at the moment the decision must be made. To pick a prominent recent example, during its 2014 independence referendum, Scotland confronted uncertainty about future petroleum prices and its ability to join the E.U. as an independent state. It is quite legitimate -and may lead to better decisions -to make this missing information explicit in the collective decision procedure by representing it as an unknown "state of nature" s ∈ S, so that each voter submits her judgment contingent on the state. In a binary (single-issue) decision problem, analogously to Example 5.2.1 above, the median rule would base the decision on the expected majority margin s∈S p s µ s .
The relevant probability weights λ s = p s could be obtained in various ways. For example, they might be obtained by some judgment aggregation rule from the voters themselves. Or, the group may delegate this judgment to an 'outside authority', for example to betting markets. 
where, for all a, b ∈ A, we defined
The median rule thus yields an extension of the Kemeny rule to uncertainty. Note that the ex ante comparison depends as much on the size of the majorities as on their sign.
Multiple Criteria.
Applied to elections for public office, the standard ranking model can be interpreted as trying to determine the (impartially best) candidate based on an overall comparative evaluation of candidates in terms of their "suitability for office".
It might be argued that this gives too much room for subjective impressions of personal appeal of candidates, and that "suitability for office" can be more soundly elicited by explicitly taking account of its multi-criterial nature, on the view that "suitability for office" consists of a combination of rather distinct, identifiable qualities such as leadership, integrity, judgment, etc.. The multi-criterion conception of candidate merit can be captured by the uniform decision model as follows. Let the base context again be the standard ranking context X rk A from Example 1, and let each s represent a different criterion. An input judgment y consists of an S-tuple of rankings (y s ) s∈S , with y s representing the ranking of candidates in terms of criterion s. The uniform output judgment x represents the overall group ranking to be determined. It is based on weight vector λ ∈ R S + describing the relative importance of these criteria. These can be deteremined in different ways: they could be determined concurrently by the group itself, by a separate committee or at an earlier 'constitutional' stage at which the general requirements for the office where determined.
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In this setting, the median rule selects the ranking with highest overall majority support (9), where again the overall majority support µ ab for ranking of a over b is given the weighted average (10) . In this manner, the median rule thus yields an extension of the Kemeny rule to multiple criteria.
The general approach to multi-criterion evaluation just outlined here is not premised on the particular, comparative format evaluation in terms of rankings; an alternative format of interest is non-comparative in terms of "grades". In this vein, Balinski and Laraki (2010, ch. 21 ) introduce a multi-criteria majority grading rule 16 which -setting aside the 15 Switching the setting, a hiring committee or university department may be tasked to evaluate an applicant for an open faculty position in terms of research, teaching and service, and the weights of these might be predetermined by standing university policy.
16 Their term is "multi-criteria majority judgment".
treatment of tied grades -is equivalent to the weighted median rule in the uniform decision model for a base context that describes grading as follows. Let (G, >) be a finite, linearly ordered set, each element being interpreted as a grade. Grading can be defined as a judgment context (G, X G , X G , λ), where the issues g ∈ G are interpreted as whether or not the object of evaluation achieves at least grade g, and the set of admissible grade assignments is given by X G = {x ∈ {±1}
G ; x g ≥ x g whenever g ≤ g }, with typical element (1, . . . 1, 0, . . . , 0) . The input space and output space agree, Y G = X G ; the issue weights λ turn out to be immaterial.
Characterization of the weighted median rule
To obtain a weighted generalization of Theorem 1, we must consider weighted combinations of weighted contexts. These are given by weighted contexts of the form
, where λ = ( λ 1 , . . . , λ N ) ∈ R N ·K is proportional to λ; that is, for for each n ∈ [1, .., N ], λ n = c n λ, for some c n > 0. So, for a proportional weight vector λ, the relative weights within the set of basic issues K are the same (original ones) in each instance, while different instances may be assigned different relative weights reflected in the scaling factor c n . The potential differences in the scaling factor may have different origins, as in the uniform decision model of Section 5.2. In particular, they could reflect differences in frequency, probability or relative importance. We are now in a position to state the axiom of Weighted Ensemble Supermajority Efficiency. WESME. For any set of instances N , any vector of weights λ proportional to λ, and any profile µ ∈ ∆ Y N , any element of
Here is the extension of Proposition 1 to weighted contexts.
Proposition 3 Let F be a judgement aggregation rule on a weighted judgement context C. If F satisfies WESME and Continuity, then F is an additive majority rule like (7).
Note that the consideration of proportional weights is needed only to deal with the case of irrational-valued weight vectors λ in the base context. If all weights are rational, then it is sufficient to confine attention to weight vectors λ such that λ n = λ for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ]. (See Nehring and Pivato (2018) for more information.)
To obtain an axiomatic characterization of the median rule on a weighted judgement context C, we will need C to satisfy some structural conditions. For any µ ∈ ∆({±1} K ), let x µ be the majority ideal, as defined below formula (1) above. A judgement space Y is McGarvey if, for all x ∈ {±1} K , there is some µ ∈ ∆(Y) such that x µ = x. 17 For example, the spaces X Let x, y, z ∈ {±1} K . We say that y is between x and z if, for any k ∈ K such that x k = z k , we also have y k = z k (and hence, y k = x k ). Now let X ⊆ {±1} K be a judgement space. Say that x, z ∈ {±1} K are near if there is no y ∈ X \{x, z} such that y is between x and z. We will say that X is distal if there exist some x, z ∈ X such that x is near z and d(x, z) ≥ 3. Heuristically, this means that the elements of X are not packed tightly together everywhere. For any z ∈ {±1} K \X , let X z be the set of views in X that are near to z; heuristically, these are the "best admissible approximations" to z. We say that X is rugged if there exists z ∈ {±1} K \X and x, y ∈ X z such that d(x, z) = d(y, z). Both distality and ruggedness are conditions on the combinatorial geometry of X , and typically easy to verify. Ruggedness seems to be satisfied in the great majority of cases, while distality is somewhat more restrictive. Indeed, distality "almost" implies ruggedness. That is, suppose that there exist some x, z ∈ X such that x is near z and d(x, z) ≥ 3, and assume additionally that some such d(x, z) is odd. Consider any y ∈ {±1} K \{x, z} such that y is between x and z. Since x is near z, y ∈ {±1}
, verifying the ruggedness of X . We now come to the second main result of this paper.
Theorem 2 Let (K, λ, X , Y) be a weighted judgement context, and suppose that either (a) X is rugged and Y is McGarvey, or (b) X is distal and Y is thick. Let F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X be a judgement aggregation rule. Then F satisfies WESME, Continuity, and Reinforcement if and only if F is the median rule (8).
Thus (weighted) median rules (8) are both (weighted) additive majority rules and scoring rules in the sense of Myerson (1995) or Dietrich (2014) . Both types of judgment aggregation rules are arguably fundamental, but they are characterized by distinct separability conditions: separability in issues versus separability in individuals. (Weighted) median rules are separable in both of these senses. Indeed, since scoring rules satisfy Reinforcement in general, Theorem 2 provides general conditions under which weighted median rules are the only rules with this "double separability".
The presuppositions of Theorem 2 are satisfied in many applications of interest, but they are more restrictive than those of Theorem 1. We illustrate their broad applicability in a variety of examples before providing a nonexample.
1. As already mentioned, the spaces of rankings (Example 1) and of classifiers (Example 2) are McGarvey. They are also easily seen to be rugged. Furthermore, the latter is distal, while the former is not.
2. In the assignment problems of Section 5.1, the input space is trivially McGarvey as it is an approval space. For B ≥ 3, it is rugged. To see this, consider for the assignments z := ((a 1 , a 1 , a 2 )), x := ((a 1 , a 3 , a 2 )) and y := ((a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )). Note that x and y are feasible, while z is not. Evidently, x and y are adjacent to z; the triple of views verifies ruggedness since d(z,x) = 4 while d(z, y) = 8.
3. In the uniform decision problems of Section 5.2, it follows from elementary linear algebra to see that Y is thick if and only if Y is thick. On the other hand, for any x, y ∈ X , d ((x, . . . x), (y, . . . , y)) = |S| d(x, y). Thus X is distal whenever |S| ≥ 3.
It is not surprising that Theorem 2 needs the domain Y to satisfy a richness condition such as thickness or the McGarvey property. It is perhaps more surprising that the codomain X must satisfy a structural condition like ruggedness or distality. To see why these conditions are necessary, consider the following class of additive majority rules. For any α > 0, we define φ α : [−1, 1]−→R by φ α (r) := sign(r) · |r| α . The corresponding additive majority rule F φ α is called a homogeneous rule. Note that the median rule is just the homogeneous rule with α = 1. Now let K be a finite set, and define 18 But Theorem 2 fails on this space. Its normative assumptions fail to single out the median rule uniquely, but are satisfied by any homogeneous rule.
+ be a weight vector, and let C :
For any α > 0, the rule F α satisfies Reinforcement, Continuity, and WESME on C. If λ is the uniform weight vector, then F α is equivalent to the median rule on C. But if λ not uniform and α = 1, then F α is not the median rule on C.
The structural assumptions of Theorem 2 fail for X K L,M . To see that X = X K 0,M is not rugged, for example, one simply notes that, for any z / ∈ X , x is near z iff #x = M and if, for all k ∈ K, x k = 1 implies z k = 1. Thus, for any x near z, we have d(x, z) = #z − M, contradicting ruggedness. The failure of distality is verified easily as well.
Note that one can translate any judgment aggregation context with rational weights into an 'equivalent' judgment aggregation context with uniform weights by "cloning" issues in proportion to their weight. However, in this translation, due to the cloning, thickness of the input space tends to get lost. So one can use Proposition 4 to produce a non-thick counterexample to Theorem 1 in the unweighted case.
A sketch of the proofs. Theorems 1 and 2 are both results on judgment contexts and consequences of a more basic result on judgment aggregation rules, Theorem B.1, which appears in Appendix B. From Propositions 1 and 3, we know that any rule satisfying Continuity and (W)ESME is an additive majority rule F φ , for some gain function φ. Thus, the key task in the proof of Theorem B.1 is to show that the identity function (or any linear function) on [−1, 1] is among these gain functions.
A possible strategy would be to try to show that any representing gain function was linear. If φ was real-valued, it would then be enough to show that φ satisfies the Cauchy functional equation, and whence deduce linearity. But this straightforward-looking strategy fails for two reasons. First of all, Propositions 1 and 3 do not guarantee that φ is realvalued, so one cannot appeal to the Cauchy functional equation. Second, the conclusions of Theorems 1 and 2 do not require that all representing gain functions φ are linear, only that some of them are. Indeed, Approval Voting on size-L committees provides 18 X K L,M is often used to represent committee selection problems, as in Example 3: K is a set of potential "candidates", and the committee in question must have at least L and most M members. It also arises in certain resource allocation problems. But these interpretations are not relevant for Proposition 4. a counterexample, in which the assumptions of Theorem 1 are satisfied, but any AMR agrees with the median rule, whatever the gain functions.
Hence this strategy is a nonstarter. Instead, the proof of Theorem B.1 shows in a couple of steps that any representing φ has the "linearity-like" property that φ(r + ) − φ(r) = φ(s + ) − φ(r) for any r and s, and any sufficiently small ; in effect, this says that φ has a "constant slope" property. This is enough to show that F φ is the median rule, because it implies that a gain (or loss) of in the majority support on one issue can be exactly offset be a gain (or loss) of in the support on another issue.
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To show in turn that φ satisfies this "constant slope" property, we must study "perfect tie" profiles µ ∈ ∆(Y) such that F (µ) = {x, y} for some x, y ∈ X . If the set of such "perfect tie" profiles is not empty, then it is a relatively open subset of an affine hyperplane (this is a consequence of Continuity and Reinforcement); we can then demonstrate the "constant slope" property by looking at how the values of φ( µ) change as µ moves around in this hyperplane. However, we also need x and y to differ in at least three coordinates -in effect, this is because we need the freedom to manipulate the r, s, and variables independently while preserving the perfect tie. In this case, let's say that {x, y} is a suitable pair.
Theorem B.1 just assumes that a suitable pair exists for the given judgment aggregation rule F . So to derive Theorems 1 and 2 from Theorem B.1, we must provide conditions on the judgment context which guarantee the existence of a suitable pair , for any judgment aggregation rule satisfying the normative assumptions. This is done in Theorem B.2 in the Appendix in terms of a constructive condition of 'frangibility' on contexts.
If X is rugged and Y is McGarvey, then frangibility of the context follows from Lemma B.1 in the Appendix; meanwhile if X is distal and Y is thick, then frangibility of the context follows from Lemma B.2. Finally, Theorem 2 follows by combining Theorem B.2 with Lemmas B.1 and B.2.
For unweighted judgement contexts, a second route is available. If there exists a suitable pair, then we can argue as above. Otherwise, that is if d(x, y) ≤ 2 whenever F (µ) = {x, y}, then we can use a straightforward geometric argument (along with the three axioms) to show that F is the median rule. This is why Theorem 1 does not require the auxiliary structural conditions of Theorem 2. On the other hand, it is typically not the case that d(x, y) ≤ 2 whenever F (µ) = {x, y}. Thus, even in the unweighted case, the proof of Theorem 1 requires the full force of Theorem B.1.
Appendix A: Proofs of minor results
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 to 4.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 3. Both statements follow from Corollary 5.2 of Nehring and Pivato (2018) . Let C := {C N ; N ∈ N} (in the unweighted case of Section 3), and let C := {C p ; p ∈ ∆ N and N ∈ N} (in the weighted case of Section 5). Let
. Then in the terminology of Nehring and Pivato (2018) , F * is a judgement aggregation rule on C , and it satisfies the axiom of Combination (in either the weighted or unweighted case) and Scale invariance (in the weighted case). The axioms ESME (in the unweighted case) or WESME (in the weighted case) say that F * satisfies the axiom of Supermajority efficiency on C . Finally, Continuity says that the rule F is continuous on ∆(Y). Thus, Corollary 5.2 of Nehring and Pivato (2018) says that F is an additive majority rule. 2
The proof of Proposition 2 requires some preliminaries. Let (K, λ, X , Y) be a judgement context, and let F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X be a judgement aggregation rule. For any µ, ν ∈ ∆(Y), define µ ⊕ ν := Even Reinforcement:
Even Judgement Consistency: For any µ, µ , ν, ν ∈ ∆(Y), and any views x, y ∈ X , if (a) y ∈ F (µ ⊕ ν), and (b) x ∈ F (µ ⊕ ν), and (c) y ∈ F (µ ⊕ ν), and
Lemma A.1 Let C = (K, λ, X , Y) be any judgement context, and let F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X be any judgement aggregation rule. If F satisfies Even Judgement Consistency, then F satisfies Even Reinforcement.
Proof: Let µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ ∆(Y).
Claim 1: Let y ∈ X . If y ∈ F (µ 1 ) and y ∈ F (µ 2 ), then y ∈ F (µ 1 ⊕ µ 2 ).
Proof: Set µ = ν = µ 1 and µ = ν = µ 2 . Then for any x ∈ X \ {y}, Even Judgement Consistency says: if (a) y ∈ F (µ 1 ), and (bd) x ∈ F (µ 1 ⊕ µ 2 ), and (c) y ∈ F (µ 2 ⊕ µ 1 ), then y ∈ F (µ 2 ). Taking the contrapositive, if y ∈ F (µ 2 ), then one of the hypotheses (a), (bd), or (c) must be false. In particular, if y ∈ F (µ 2 ) and y ∈ F (µ 1 ), then
This holds for all x ∈ X \ {y}. Now, by contradiction, suppose y ∈ F (µ 2 ) and y ∈ F (µ 1 ), but y ∈ F (µ 1 ⊕ µ 2 ). Applying (A1), we obtain x ∈ F (µ 1 ⊕ µ 2 ) for all x ∈ X \ {y}, which means that F (µ 1 ⊕ µ 2 ) = ∅. This is a contradiction. The claim follows.
3 Claim 1
Claim 2: Let y ∈ X . If F (µ 1 ) ∩ F (µ 2 ) = ∅, and y ∈ F (µ 2 ), then y ∈ F (µ 1 ⊕ µ 2 ).
Proof: Let x ∈ F (µ 1 ) ∩ F (µ 2 ). If we set µ = ν = µ 2 and µ = ν = µ 1 , then Even Judgement Consistency says: if (a) y ∈ F (µ 1 ⊕ µ 2 ), and (b) x ∈ F (µ 2 ), and (c) y ∈ F (µ 2 ), and (d) x ∈ F (µ 1 ), then (e) y ∈ F (µ 2 ⊕ µ 1 ). Thus, y ∈ F (µ 2 ⊕ µ 1 ), as claimed.
Combining Claims 1 and 2, we conclude that, if
Lemma A.2 Let C = (K, λ, X , Y) be any judgement context, and suppose F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X satisfies Continuity. If F satisfies Even Reinforcement, then F satisfies Reinforcement.
Proof: Let µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ ∆(Y), and suppose F (µ 1 ) ∩ F (µ 2 ) = ∅. Let Q 2 be the set of dyadic rationals (that is, Q 2 := { n 2 k ; n and k integers, k > 0}).
Thus, applying Even Reinforcement again, we deduce that
µ 2 . Iterating this argument yields the claim, by induction.
Now, Q 2 is dense in R. Thus, Continuity and Claim 1 imply that
Proof: Suppose y ∈ F (µ 1 ). We must show that y ∈ F (r µ 1 + (1 − r) µ 2 ) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. By contradiction, let R y := {r ∈ [0, 1]; y ∈ F (r µ 1 + (1 − r) µ 2 )}, and suppose R y = ∅. By Continuity, 1 is not a cluster point of R y (because y ∈ F (µ 1 )). Thus, if R := sup(R), then R < 1. Now let r ∈ R y . Find some s ∈ (R, 1) such that r/s = q ∈ Q 2 .
Let
Hence y ∈ F (r µ 1 + (1 − r) µ 2 ), which contradicts the fact that r ∈ R y .
To avert the contradiction, we must have R y = ∅. This argument works for any y ∈ F (µ 1 ), and likewise any y ∈ F (µ 2 ). The claim follows.
3 Claim 2 Statement (A2) and Claim 2 imply For any weight vector λ = (λ k ) k∈K , and any exponent α > 0, we define the correspondence
We also define
Let α, β > 0, and let λ, κ ∈ R
, and let J := {k ∈ K; µ k > 0}. There are now three cases.
is the view with x j = 1 for all j ∈ J and
. By reordering the elements of K = [1 . . . K] if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that
so this sum is also uniquely maximized by x, so
for some N, P with N ≤ M ≤ P . In this case, the sums (A5) and (A6) have more than one maximizer.
20 Even in this case, however, it is easy to see that they have exactly the same set of maximizers, so once again
20 To be precise, they have
Case 3. Suppose |J | < L. The argument is similar to Case 2. Again, assume without loss of generality that (A4) holds. If η L µ L > η L+1 µ L+1 , then by invoking equations (A5) and (A6), we see that
, then the sums (A5) and (A6) have more than one maximizer, but they have the same maximizers, so that
Now, fix λ ∈ R K + , and consider the judgement context C :
Here, ( * ) is obtained by comparing equations (7) and (A3), while ( †) follows from Claim 1. Now, F 1 κ is just the (κ-weighted) median rule; thus,
This proves the first assertion of Proposition 4. (Discrepancies between these two rules can be constructed using reasoning similar to the proof of Claim 1.) Thus, statement (A7) implies that F α is not the median rule on C. This proves the third assertion of Proposition 4. 2
We will frequently use the following result.
Lemma A.3 Any additive majority rule is SME on any judgement context.
Proof: See Corollary 5.2 from Nehring and Pivato (2018) . 2
Appendix B: Proofs of the main results
In the proofs of our main results, we will require the judgement context and the rule to satisfy one of two hypotheses. We will say that a judgement context C = (K, λ, X , Y) has balanced weights if for all x, y ∈ X with only two issues i, j ∈ K such that x i = y j and x j = y j (so that d(x, y) = 2), we have λ i = λ j . If F is a judgement aggregation rule, then we will say that F is compatible with C if there is some µ ∈ ∆(Y) such that F (C, µ) = {x, y} for some x, y ∈ X with d(x, y) ≥ 3. Note that any unweighted judgement context automatically has balanced weights. Thus, we will later invoke balanced weights to prove Theorem 1. On the other hand, we will invoke compatibility to prove Theorem B.2. Indeed, Theorems 1 and B.2 are both consequences of the following, more general result.
Theorem B.1 Let C = (K, λ, X , Y) be a weighted judgement context where Y is thick, and let F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X be an additive majority rule. Suppose that either C has balanced weights or F is compatible with C. Then F satisfies Continuity and Reinforcement if and only if it is the median rule (8).
Before proving Theorem B.1, we introduce some notation. Let F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X be any additive majority rule, and let C := conv(Y). For any c ∈ C, there exists some µ ∈ ∆(Y) such that µ = c. We then define F (c) := F (C, µ). By inspection of defining formulae (4) and (7), it is clear that this definition is independent of the choice of µ. Thus, we can define a correspondence F : C ⇒ X . We will make use of this convention frequently in what follows. For any x ∈ X , define
Let o C be the topological interior of C as a subset of
and
Let K(x, y) := {k ∈ K; x k = y k }. Thus, for any µ ∈ ∆(Y), and any gain function
because (x k − y k ) = 0 for all k ∈ K \ K(x, y). In particular, if µ ∈ B F x,y -that is, if {x, y} ⊆ F (X , µ) -then the sum (B4) must be zero. Proof: Observe that z k = x k = y k for all k ∈ K \ K(x, y), while z k = 0 for all k ∈ K(x, y). Let > 0 and let z := x + (1 − ) z. Then sign(z k ) = x k for all k ∈ K; thus, F (z ) = {x} by supermajority efficiency (because of Lemma A.3). Likewise, if Proof: Lemma A.3 says that F is supermajority efficient (SME); thus, F (x) = {x}. By hypothesis, {x, y} ⊆ F (b). Thus, for all s ∈ [0, 1) we have
Claim 3: For all x, y ∈ X , if there exists µ ∈ ∆(Y) with F (C, µ) = {x, y}, then
is nonempty, and it is a relatively open subset of some affine hyperplane in R K .
Proof: Let K := |K|. For all x ∈ X , Reinforcement implies that C F x is a convex subset of C. Continuity implies that C 
Define the convex sets: 
Continuity implies that F (p) = {x} for all points p ∈ P close to d x and F (p) = {y} for all points p ∈ P close to d y . Thus, Continuity yields some p 0 ∈ P such that F (p 0 ) = {x, y}; thus p 0 ∈ D 0 . Thus, d x and d y lie in different path components of D \ D 0 .
Claim 3A
Claim 3A implies that D 0 meets the interior of D, which means it meets
x,y ; thus, we deduce that 3 Claim 3 Claim 4: (a) For any x ∈ X , C F x is a closed, convex polyhedron in R K , and
x,y = ∅, then it is contained a codimension-1 face of (∂C The strategy of the proof is now as follows. Claim 4(a) tells us that the sets {C F x } x∈X partition C into closed, convex polyhedra, which overlap only on their boundaries. By a similar argument, the median rule also partitions C into closed, convex polyhedra {C med x } x∈X , which overlap only on their boundaries. We will show that these two partitions are identical. To do this, it suffices to show that the codimension-1 faces of C x,y , we must perform a corresponding perturbation analysis on the gain function φ. To do this, we need some control over "φ-increments" of the form φ(r + δ) − φ(r), where r ∈ [−1, 1] and δ is a "small" perturbation. To acheive this, Claims 5 to 9 establish more and more precise control over these φ-increments. For all i ∈ K, let e i := (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), where the 1 appears in the ith coordinate. (a) For any δ i , δ j ∈ R,
(b) Let r := b i and s = b j . There exists rs > 0 and a unique constant c rs > 0 (which is determined by x, y, i, and j) such that, for any ∈ (− rs , rs ), we have
Here, both ( ) are because (
(b) By negating the i coordinate and/or j coordinate of X and Y if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that x i = y j = 1 and x j = y i = −1. Claim 3 yields some vector v ∈ R K and some constant a ∈ R such that 
where ( * ) is by setting δ i := and δ j := c rs in part (a), and noting that (x i − y i ) = 2 while (x j −y j ) = −2. Thus, we conclude that φ(r+ )−φ(r) = λ j λ i φ(s + c rs ) − φ(s) , as desired. Finally, observe that c rs > 0 and is unique, because φ is strictly increasing. (b) For all t ∈ T r , there is an open interval E tr containing 0 such that, for all ∈ E tr , we have φ(r + ) − φ(r) = φ(t + ) − φ(t).
Proof: (a) Since d(x, y) ≥ 3, there is a third coordinate k ∈ K(x, y) \ {i, j}. 
, for all sufficiently small , where c ts = −v i /v j . This works for all t ∈ T r . But r ∈ T r ; thus, in particular c rs = −v i /v j . Thus, c ts = c rs for all t ∈ T r , as claimed.
(b) Let t ∈ T r , and let t := min{ rs , ts }, where these are defined as in Claim 5(b). Then t > 0, and for all ∈ (− t , t ), we have
where ( * ) is by Claim 5(b), and ( †) is by Claim 5(b) and part (a).
x,y and i ∈ K(x, y) for some x, y ∈ X with d(x, y) ≥ 3}. Note that R > 0 if and only if F and C are compatible. Thus, Claims 7, 8 and 9 (below) are non-vacuous if C is compatible with F .
Claim 7: (Assuming compatibility) For all r ∈ 0, R , there is an open interval T r containing r, and for all t ∈ T r , there is an open interval E tr containing 0, such that, for any ∈ E tr , we have φ(t + ) − φ(t) = φ(r + ) − φ(r). 
Thus, Claim 6 yields some neighbourhood T r around r, and for all t ∈ T r , an open interval E tr containing 0, such that, for all t ∈ T r and ∈ E tr we have φ(t + ) − φ(t) = φ(r + ) − φ(r).
3 Claim 7 Claim 8: (Assuming compatibility) For all r, s ∈ 0, R , there exists = (r, s) > 0 containing 0, such that, for any ∈ (− , ), we have φ(s + ) − φ(s) = φ(r + ) − φ(r).
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose r < s. For all q ∈ [r, s], let T q be as in Claim 7. The family {T q } q∈ [r,s] is an open cover of the compact set [r, s] , so it has a finite subcover, say {T q 0 , . . . , T q N }, where r = q 0 ≤ q 1 < q 2 < · · · < q N ≤ s = q N . By dropping to a subsequence of {q 0 , q 1 , . . . , q N } if necessary, we can ensure that q n ∈ T q n−1 for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ] (because these intervals cover [r, s] ). For all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], let E qn,q n−1 be the open interval around 0 defined in Claim 7. Let
where each equality is an invocation of Claim 7. In other words, φ(s + ) − φ(s) = φ(r + ) − φ(r), as claimed.
Claim 9: (Assuming compatibility) For all r ∈ 0, R , there is some δ = δ(r) > 0 such that for any q ∈ Q ∩ [−1, 1], we have φ(r + q δ) − φ(r) = q · [φ(r + δ) − φ(s)].
Proof: Find δ > 0 such that 0 < r − δ < r + δ < R. Thus, if we define S := [r − δ, r + δ], then S ⊂ (0, R). Thus, for all s ∈ S, Claim 8 yields some s := (r, s) > 0 such that φ(s + ) − φ(s) = φ(r + ) − φ(r) for all ∈ (− s , s ). It is easily verified that the function S s → s ∈ R + is continuous. The interval S is compact. Thus, there exists some > 0 such that s ≥ for all s ∈ S. Now, let M 0 ∈ N be large enough that δ/M 0 < . For any rational number q ∈ [−1, 1], we can write q = N/M for some N ∈ [−M . . . M ] and some M ∈ N with M ≥ M 0 . Thus, if we define := δ/M , then < , and q δ = N , and we have
where ( * ) is by N applications of Claim 8 (which applies because for all n ∈ [1 . . . N ], we have s := r + (n − 1) ∈ S and < ≤ s ). In particular, if q = 1 (so that N = M ), then (B6) yields
which means that
For any q = N/M ∈ [−1, 1], if we substitute (B7) into (B6), we get
as desired.
Claim 10: Let x, y ∈ X be distinct, and let
x,y ⊂ H x,y . Proof: First suppose d(x, y) = 1, and let K(x, y) = {i}. Then H x,y = {r ∈ R K ; r i = 0}. By negating the ith coordinate of X and Y if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that x i = 1 and y i = −1. Then for any µ ∈ ∆(Y), if µ i > 0 then y ∈ SME (C, µ) (because γ x,µ (q) ≥ γ y,µ (q) for all q ∈ [0, 1], and γ x,µ (q) ≥ γ y,µ (q) + λ i for all q ∈ [0, µ i ].) Likewise, if µ i < 0 then x ∈ SME (C, µ). Thus, if {x, y} ⊆ SME (C, µ), then we must have µ i = 0. Since F is SME, it follows that B F x,y ⊂ H x,y . Now suppose d(x, y) ≥ 2. There are now two cases: Either C is compatible with F , or it is not compatible with F , but has balanced weights.
Case A. Suppose C is not compatible with F , but has balanced weights. If x, y ∈ X , and o B F x,y = ∅, then we must have d(x, y) ≤ 2 (because C is not compatible with F ). We have already dealt with the case d(x, y) = 1, so suppose d(x, y) = 2. Let K(x, y) = {i, j}. By balanced weights, we must have λ i = λ j . For simplicity, suppose λ i = λ j = 1. By negating the ith and jth coordinate of X and Y if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that x i = y j = 1 and y i = x j = −1. Thus, H x,y = {r ∈ R K ; r i = r j }. Now, for any µ ∈ ∆(Y), if µ i > µ j then y ∈ SME (C, µ) (because γ x,µ (q) ≥ γ y,µ (q) for all q ∈ [0, 1], and γ x,µ (q) ≥ γ y,µ (q)+1 for all q ∈ ( µ j , µ i ].) Likewise, if µ i < µ j then x ∈ SME (C, µ). Thus, if {x, y} ⊆ SME (C, µ), then we must have µ i = µ j . Since F is SME, it follows that B F x,y ⊂ H x,y . Case B. Suppose F and C are compatible. Then R > 0. Let x, y ∈ X , and suppose d(x, y) ≥ 2. Let J := K(x, y) and let L := K \ J . By negating the i and/or j coordinates of X and Y if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that x j = 1 and y j = −1 for all j ∈ J . Let z := 1 2
x,y by Claim 1 and Reinforcement, as explained above. If u is small enough, then we have b u i ∈ (0, R) for all i ∈ K(x, y). Claim 10A: For any distinct i, j ∈ K(x, y), there exists > 0 such that, . But we don't know that φ is linear; instead, Claim 9 only tells us that φ is "locally Q-linear". Thus, we must approximate θ with rational numbers.
Let {q n } ∞ n=1 be a decreasing sequence in Q ∩ [0, 1] with lim n→∞ q n = θ. For all n ∈ N, we have
and thus,
where ( Since (x i − y i ) = (x j − y j ) = 2, the inequality (B8) yields u + (λ j e i − λ i e j ), which proves the claim.
x,y is a relatively open subset of some affine hyperplane H. Claims 10A and 10B imply that H is parallel to all vectors in the set {(λ j e i − λ i e j ); i, j ∈ J } ∪ {e ; ∈ L}. But the hyperplane H x,y is spanned by this set. Thus, H is parallel to H x,y . Let z = (x + y)/2. Then z ∈ H x,y . But Claim 1 and Reinforcement imply that z is a cluster point of o B F x,y . Thus, H = H x,y .
3 Claim 10 For any x ∈ X , let C med x := {c ∈ C; x ∈ Median (X , c)}. Then C med x is a convex polyhedron whose supporting hyperplanes are the sets H x,y (from Claim 10) for all y ∈ X \ {y}, along with the supporting hyperplanes of C itself. Claims 4 and 10 show that every one of these supporting hyperplanes is also a supporting hyperplane of the convex polyhedron C for all x ∈ X . However, the systems {C F x } x∈X and {C med x } x∈X are each partitions of C into closed convex polyhedra which meet only along their boundaries. Thus, they must be identical. Thus, F is the median rule. 2
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to verify that the median rule (3) satisfies ESME, Continuity, and Reinforcement; we must verify the converse. So, suppose F is a rule satisfying these axioms. Proposition 1 says that F is an additive majority rule, because it satisfies ESME and Continuity. Any unweighted judgement context obviously has balanced weights. Thus, if F also satisfies Reinforcement, then Theorem B.1 says it is the median rule. 2
Theorem 2 is a consequence of a more general result, involving a more complicated structural condition. Let F be a judgement aggregation rule on the context C = (K, λ, X , Y), and let Θ ⊂ ∆(Y) be a collection of profiles. Let V Theorem B.2 Let C = (K, λ, X , Y) be a frangible weighted judgement context such that Y is thick, and let F : ∆(Y) ⇒ X be a judgement aggregation rule. Then F satisfies WESME, Continuity, and Reinforcement if and only if F is the median rule (8).
Proof: Suppose C is frangible and Y is thick, and F is an additive majority rule satisfying Continuity and Reinforcement. It suffices to show that C and F are compatible.
Since C is frangible, there is some open, connected Θ ⊆ ∆(Y) and some v, w ∈ V In fact, we will now show that we can assume without loss of generality that for all x, y ∈ X , if α crosses from C To avoid this contradiction, C must be compatible with F . Then Theorem B.1 says that F is the median rule (8).
2
Case (a) of Theorem 2 follows from Theorem B.2 and the next result.
Lemma B.1 Let C = (K, λ, X , Y). If X is rugged and Y is McGarvey, then C is frangible.
Proof: Let z ∈ {±1} K \ X and x, y ∈ X z be such that d(x, z) = d(y, z). (By ruggedness, such a z exists). Let Θ := {µ ∈ ∆(Y); x µ = z} = {µ ∈ ∆(Y); sign( µ k ) = z k , for all k ∈ K}. Now let F be any additive majority rule satisfying Continuity. We will show that (V F Θ , F ∼) is disconnected. First, we need some terminology. A view x ∈ X is Condorcet admissible for µ if there does not exist any other y ∈ X such that y k µ k ≥ x k µ k for all k ∈ K -in other words, there is no view y ∈ X which agrees with the majority in a strictly larger set of issues than those where x agrees with the majority. Let Cond(X , µ) ⊆ X be the set of all views that are Condorcet admissible for µ.
21 It is easily verified that supermajority efficiency (for any λ) implies Condorcet admissibility. Thus, SME (X , λ, µ) ⊆ Cond(X , µ).
Claim 2: V F Θ = X z .
Proof: "⊆ For any µ ∈ Θ, we must have F (µ) ⊆ SME (X , µ) ⊆ Cond(X , µ). But Cond(X , µ) ⊆ X z by Lemma 1.5 of . "⊇" Let x ∈ X z . Let J := {j ∈ K; x j = z j }. By negating certain coordinates of X and Y if necessary, we can assume without loss of generality that z j = x j = 1 for all j ∈ J . Since Y is McGarvey, there exists some µ ∈ ∆(Y) such that µ j > 0 for all j ∈ J and µ k = 0 for all k ∈ K \ J (by Footnote 17). Since z is near to x, there is no other y ∈ X \ {x} such that y j = 1 for all j ∈ J . Thus, SME (X , µ) = {x}. Thus, F (µ) = {x}, because F is supermajority efficient by Lemma A.3.
Let θ ∈ Θ be arbitrary. For all s ∈ [0, 1], define µ s := s θ + (1 − s) µ. Thus, lim s→0 µ s = µ. Thus, Continuity implies that F (µ s ) = {x} for all s sufficiently close to zero. But for all s > 0, we have µ s ∈ Θ (because for all k ∈ K we have sign( µ s k ) = sign(s θ k + (1 − s) µ k ) = sign( θ k ) = z k ). Thus, x ∈ V F Θ . This argument works for all x ∈ X z , so V F Θ ⊇ X z , as claimed. Either i ∈ K(v, z) or i ∈ K(w, z), but not both. Likewise, either j ∈ K(v, z) or j ∈ K(w, z), but not both.
By the definition of z, there exist x, y ∈ X z such that d(x, z) = d(y, z). Claim 2 says that x, y ∈ V F Θ , and Claim 3 implies that they must be in different This argument works for any additive majority rule (actually, any supermajority efficient rule) satisfying Continuity. Thus, C is frangible.
Case (b) of Theorem 2 follows from Theorem B.2 and the next result.
Lemma B.2 Let C = (K, λ, X , Y). If X ⊆ {±1} K is distal, then C is frangible.
Proof: By hypothesis, there exist some x, z ∈ X with x near to z and d(x, z) ≥ 3. Let δ x and δ z be the point masses at x and z, respectively, and let µ := 1 2 (δ x + δ z ). Let Θ be an open ball of small radius around µ; Θ is obviously open and connected. Now let F be any additive majority rule satisfying Continuity. We claim that V F θ ⊆ {x, z}. To see this, let J := K(x, y) and let L := K \ J . Without loss of generality, suppose x = z = 1 for all ∈ L. Then µ = 1 for all ∈ L, while µ j = 0 for all j ∈ J . Fix a weight vector λ ∈ R K + , and let Λ = ∈L λ . Then for any y ∈ X and any q ∈ [0, 1], we have γ λ µ,x (q) = γ λ µ,z (q) = Λ ≥ γ λ µ,y (q), with equality if and only if y is between x and z. But x is near to z, so there is no y ∈ X \ {x, y} which is between x and z. Thus, SME (X , µ) ⊆ {x, z}. Thus, Lemma A.3 implies that F (µ) ⊆ {x, z}. If we make the ball Θ small enough, then Continuity implies that F (θ) ⊆ {x, z} for all θ ∈ Θ; thus, V δ z for all n ∈ N. Then by an argument similar to the previous paragraph, supermajority efficiency implies that F n (µ n ) = {x} for all n ∈ N. If n is large enough, then µ n ∈ Θ; thus, x ∈ V F Θ . By an identical argument (defining µ n := n−1 2n δ x + n+1 2n δ z for all n ∈ N), we obtain z ∈ V 
